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ABSTRACT

Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American
Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era
by
Briggs Evans
The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and
their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II. This thesis traces the origins of this
development and shows how the context of the Cold War led to a heavy influence by the
Wehrmacht on American military doctrine. By analyzing studies conducted by the United States
Army Historical Division from 1946-1961, I will show how these studies left a profound impact
on American Military doctrine, particularly in the context of the Cold War. I will show the
development of the Active Defense Doctrine and AirLand Battle during the 1970s and 1980s
were largely influenced by lessons learned from the Wehrmacht. By comparing these doctrines
with the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung, the influence is undeniable. Finally, I will show how the
American military put these lessons into practice during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
The Coming Storm: Blitzkrieg Origins and Myths
On May 10th, 1940, Nazi Germany and the Wehrmacht shocked the world with a rapid
aggressive military operation into the Republic of France. After a successful breakthrough at
Sedan, German forces subdued the French Military and conquered France in just six and a half
weeks, an achievement that was unobtainable over the course of four years from 1914-1918
during the First World War. 1 Using innovative motorized infantry tactics supported by close
coordination with Luftwaffe air power, the Wehrmacht executed Fall Gelb, Case Yellow, with a
blend of experience, intuition, and understanding, that success even surprised its German
planners. 2 This new style of modern warfare became known as Blitzkrieg or “lighting war” and
the Wehrmacht's innovative strategy definitively set the tone for the rest of the war. The German
ability to achieve strategic results so efficiently and effectively with minimal casualties caught
the attention of militaries around the world and arguably changed the conduct of warfare forever.
The purpose of this project is to analyze how Blitzkrieg doctrine has influenced modern
warfare, particularly in the United States. As this issue is hotly debated among historians and
military minds alike, I will also explore the historiographical discussions pertaining to Blitzkrieg
and its complexities. Some historians, such as Karl-Heinz Frieser and Robert Citino, have even
demonstrated that there was no official Blitzkrieg doctrine at all, as there is no example of the
term throughout interwar Wehrmacht doctrine. This paper will explore the historiographical
controversies of the word but will refer back to the term for the sake of simplicity and structure.
Ultimately, I intend to show that American military planners were drawn to the success of the

Lloyd Clark, Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lighting War, France, 1940 (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2016), 25-27.
2
Ibid., 483-486.
1
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German new style of warfare and in many ways tried to emulate its principles throughout the
twentieth century. Though the United States invested time and effort into learning from
Blitzkrieg, they did not successfully execute its principles until the first Gulf War in 1991.
In the first chapter of this project, I will explore the origins and development of the
Blitzkrieg doctrine leading up to World War Two, as well as the historiographical debates
regarding its initial success. While some military historians argue that Blitzkrieg had little
success and France was merely a stroke of luck, others have attributed the victory to superior
operational planning. 3 I will discuss the controversy of the term itself and how different
historians have wrestled with its meaning. The first chapter will also establish that Blitzkrieg
doctrine and its shocking success attracted Allied military leaders, and subsequently defined
military operations for the rest of the war. I will argue that the Wehrmacht's ability to revisit
traditional German military principles and integrate them with modern technology led to the
initial success of lighting war in first three years of the war. Though the United States and other
Allied powers ultimately achieved victory, they were never able to achieve the swift victories
that emulated Germany’s invasion of France in 1940. 4
The next chapter will examine the influence of Blitzkrieg doctrine on American military
doctrine during the postwar years. As ideological tensions developed between the United States
and Soviet Union almost immediately following the defeat of Nazi Germany, another large-scale
modern war seemed almost certain. Seeking to learn from the success and failures of the
German struggle on the Eastern Front, the United States sought to examine any information that

Ibid., 477.
Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence: University
Press of Kanas, 2004), 77
3
4
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could give them the edge against the Soviets. From 1945 to 1961, the United States Army
Historical Division interviewed and reviewed reports of German officers to write a history of the
war on the Eastern Front. As the relations between the United States and Soviet Union
deteriorated, these interviews and reports became crucial to war planning for a future conflict. 5
In this chapter I will show the United States military’s desire to learn from the Germans by
examining a collection of two hundred and thirteen of these reports. I will also examine studies
from American military institutions and how they contributed to the American militaries
understanding of Blitzkrieg doctrine. Finally, this chapter will compare and contrast the official
German military doctrine of the Second World War, Die Truppenführung, and the development
of the United States doctrine of “Airland Battle.”
The final chapter will examine what the American lessons derived from Blitzkrieg looked
like in actual practice. By examining the events of the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, I will
demonstrate how the United States was able to achieve what was considered a successful modern
Blitzkrieg. I will show similarities of the Gulf War and the 1940 invasion of France. Military
historians such as Robert Citino have cited the development of the Airland Battle doctrine as
direct evidence of Blitzkrieg’s influence on American military doctrine. 6 Developed in the
1980s, Airland Battle doctrine laid out the principles for how the United States was to conduct
warfare. At the core of this doctrine, the most important concepts include initiative, depth,
agility, and synchronization. 7 This chapter will emphasize how the United States carried out
these principles in its brief successful war with Iraq. It will also support my argument that

5
Robert W. Hutchinson, “The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division,
and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945-1946, “ Journal of Military History 4 (October 2014): 1321.
6
Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 9.
7
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm100-5(93).pdf date accessed, December 4, 2020.
P 7-0-7-12
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though the United States had a longstanding desire to emulate Blitzkrieg, it was not successful in
doing so until 1991.
Before diving into the historiographical discussions about the origins and development of
Blitzkrieg, I believe it is important to understand how historians have defined military doctrine
and its functions. Geoffrey Sloan’s article “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy, and the
Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory” examines the controversy surrounding the
definition. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines doctrine as “the fundamental
principles by which military forces guide their actions of objectives.” 8 In a literal definition the
word doctrine means “what is taught” as it comes from the Latin word doctrine. Sloan’s own
definition describes doctrine as bridge between thought and action or in other terms how military
doctrine articulates war. 9 There are many different contributing factors into how doctrine
functions, and ideally it must remain universally cohesive from top to bottom in a fighting force.
In 1997, Professor John Gooch identified six components that include: the nature of weapons and
technology, the influence of formative experiences, organizational and institutional interests,
ideology, culture, and political and strategic situations. 10 Sloan further builds off this, evaluating
the need for doctrine to perform on multiple levels of warfare including strategic, operational and
tactical levels of war. 11
Robert Citino further builds off the functions of doctrine in his book Blitzkrieg to Desert
Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. Citino asserts that military doctrine is essential to

8
Geoffrey Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis
and Theory,” International Affairs, 88, no. 2 (2012): 243.
9
Ibid., 243-244.
10
Ibid., 251.
11
Ibid., p.244.
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warfare as it fundamentally defines the objectives of an operation. 12 Without a clear objective in
mind, military commanders are essentially crashing into the enemy and hoping for the best.
Elliot Cohen ‘s chapter “War Planning” from the Cambridge History of WW2 also emphasizes
the importance of operational planning. Cohen identifies two key aspects in the development of
military doctrine. The first is addressing the requirements of the operation and preparing for its
initial phases. The next step is interwar planning and how to adjust to new circumstances or
obstacles that may hinder the campaign’s goals. 13 In other words, as the landscape of war is
rapidly changing, military commanders must be flexible in order to adjust and adapt to ensure
success. As we will see this concept of flexibility among military commanders is a key tenet of
Blitzkrieg doctrine, and arguably is one of the key qualities that ensured its success.
While historians and military thinkers have reached somewhat of a consensus regarding
doctrine and its functions, Blitzkrieg is the flip side of the coin. The historiographical debates
regarding Blitzkrieg are as fiercely contested as any topic. The most prevalent themes, however,
seem to pertain to three topics: Blitzkrieg’s origins, its myths, and its impact on modern warfare.
The origins debate focuses on the first evidence of the mobile style of warfare being
implemented. While many have focused on the final phase of World War One, historians such
as Douglas Fermer and Robert Citino point to the nineteenth century conflicts of German
unification in 1866 and the invasion of France in 1870. 14 The debate over the myths of
Blitzkrieg also is a point of contention worth exploring. Some historians have asserted that there

Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 8.
Elliot Cohen, “War Planning,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War, ed. John Ferris and
Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 533.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cho9781139855969.023. Accessed February 21, 2021.
12
13

Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 20-21; Douglas Fermer, Three German Invasions of France: the
Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2013), x-xii.
14

11

was in fact no Blitzkrieg doctrine at all, citing the absence of the word in any official Wehrmacht
doctrine. 15 German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser contends that the 1940 Blitzkrieg was
in no way an indication of the preplanned Blitzkrieg that Hitler is credited with. Rather, factors
like the changing nature of war, allied mistakes, and unauthorized German officer actions
combined for a formula for success. 16 Whether or not there was a definitive example of what
Blitzkrieg and its success were, historians have debated its impact on modern warfare. As we
will see, works such as Robert Citino’s Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle, and a recent master‘s thesis
by James Curry have examined the direct impact that Blitzkrieg had on American military
doctrine. 17
Historians have perhaps traced the origins of Blitzkrieg to the success of German
operational thinking and doctrine during the nineteenth century. Gerhard Gross’s article,
“Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era,” cites
Germany’s unique geographic position as a crucial aspect of this development. Due to
Germany’s central geographic position and its borders surrounded by potential enemies, German
military commanders such as Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke advocated for a highly trained
aggressive fighting force. The function of this force was to quickly seize the initiative by
carrying the fight to the enemy in Germany’s border regions and deliver a knockout blow to the

George Raudzens “Blitzkrieg Ambiguities: Doubtful Usage of a Famous Word.” War & Society 7, no. 2
(1989): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1179/106980489790305551.
15

Karl- Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 German Campaign in the West (Annapolis,
Maryland: US Naval Institute Press, 2013) 30-36.
16

Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 9; James Curry “From Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle: The United States
Army, the Wehrmacht, and the German Origins of Modern American Military Doctrine” (M.A. Thesis: University
of Western Australia, 2015), 1-2.
17
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enemy via maneuverability and mass of force at decisive points. 18 This force also required its
commanders to exercise flexibility and independence in its actions, because as Moltke put it “no
plan survives contact with the enemy.” 19 Douglas Fermer’s comparative study, Three German
Invasions of France: The Summer campaigns of 1870, 1914, 1940 offers one striking nineteenth
century example of Germany ‘s superior operational thinking. During the 1870 Prussian invasion
of France, Prussian forces under Moltke displayed superior planning and execution versus the
disorganized French troops. Crucially, at Sedan during early September of 1870, Prussian forces
trapped the French soldiers in a series of pincer movements that resulted in the capture of almost
100,000 men. 20 Moltke and the Prussian forces had achieved a decisive knockout blow with
minimal loss of life and effectively ended the French Empire. 21
If the Prussian victory over France in 1870 marked early traces of Blitzkrieg doctrine
success, technological advancements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century indicated
setbacks. During this time period, military campaigns were becoming larger, bloodier, and
costlier than ever before. However, campaigns were frequently following a pattern of initial
success of offensives that eventually became bogged down into grinding contests of attrition. 22
Essentially, armies were failing to achieve knockout blows that could effectively end campaigns.
Historians have cited the development of technology as a primary factor for this phenomenon,
and in some ways, it seems as if technology had surpassed humans' conceptions of warfare.
During the First World War, new weapons such as breech loading rifles, machine guns, and
Gerhard Gross, “Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era,”
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 13, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 2.
18

Robert Citino, “Beyond Fire and Movement: Command, Control and Information in the German
Blitzkrieg 1,” in Journal of Strategic Studies, 27, no. 2 (June 2004): 333.
19

Fermer, Three German Invasions, 57.
Ibid., 66-67.
22
Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm,” 14.
20
21
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rapid-fire artillery made traditional notions of mobile warfare obsolete. The growing size of
massive military forces also created problems for German military command, as they found it
increasingly difficult to control armies effectively. According to Citino, the development of
static trench warfare led back to the most important military issue, how to achieve operational
mobility. 23
While Citino asserts that World War One and new technology was perhaps a setback for
the development of Blitzkrieg doctrine, others have emphasized the war’s role in its
development. Williamson Murray contends that throughout the war the Germans proved
themselves more imaginative and adaptive than the Allies in regard to tactical and operational
conditions. He cites Generals Erich Ludendorff’s abandonment of attrition warfare in the West
in favor of a concentrated blow to the Russians in the East. The Germans on the Western front
also retreated from their initial frontlines to more favorable defensive positions from which they
could counterattack the Allies. Though the Germans did achieve victories during the final two
years of the war, they did not translate into a decisive strategic victory. 24 The seemingly
fruitless carnage of the First World War signaled a need for military powers to rethink their
approaches to warfare. New developments in technology such as tanks and aircraft, the massive
size of armies and campaigns, and the emergence of industrialized warfare based on economic
resources redefined how victory was obtainable. In the years following, military superpowers
faced the task of revamping their fighting forces. 25

Ibid., 14-18.
Williamson Murray “German Army Doctrine, 1918-1939, and the Post-1945 Theory of ‘Blitzkrieg
Strategy,” in Carole Fink, Isabel V. Hull, and MacGregor Knox, eds., German Nationalism and the European
Response, 1890-1945 (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 72-73.
23
24

25

Cohen, “War Planning,” 535-537.
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An important concept to understand during this time period is the relationship between
doctrine and command philosophy. Command philosophy is the process in which militaries
establish hierarchy, discipline, authority, and individual responsibility. 26 Geoffrey Sloan
identifies the two major variants of command philosophy being centralized and decentralized.
Both these concepts are derived from German concepts Befehlstaktik, orders-based tactics, and
Auftragstaktik, mission-based tactics. Orders-based tactics is considered a more restrictive
approach as it informs the command chain why, when, and critically, how operations will be
carried out. On the other hand, mission-based tactics inform command chains how and when
operations will be carried out but leave the how to the initiative of the officers. The first interwar commander of German forces, General Hans von Seeckt, largely instilled mission-based
tactics while also encouraging German commanders to examine how situations were handled
during previous wars. Seeckt also promoted creativity among German officers by encouraging
them to study the situations they faced in the war and how effectively they responded. He then
encouraged the officers to think of solutions to new problems that had yet been solved. Sloan
describes Seeckt as a sort of father of mobile warfare, as he sought to create a small, but well
trained and equipped mobilized fighting force that was capable of quick maneuvers and making
decisions to lead to the fast annihilation of enemy forces. 27
Principles laid out by von Seeckt’s leadership were eventually consolidated into an
official written doctrine called Die Truppenführung in the 1930s. While some historians such as
Shimon Naveh contend there in no coherent theory behind Germany’s operational thinking, 28
Truppenführung appears to embody qualities that are associated with Blitzkrieg. The first major
Sloan, “Doctrine,” 246.
Ibid., 246-247.
28
Gross, “Development of Operational Thinking,” 1.
26
27
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points describe war as an artform, “depending upon free, creative activity, that is scientifically
grounded.” 29 Truppenführung is vastly comprehensive with well over three hundred points of
how officers of the Wehrmacht are to conduct war. Some of the main themes advocated are
instinctive and decisive leadership, outflanking the enemy with mobility and speed, enveloping
enemy forces, and implementing combined arms in cohesion with offensive maneuvers. 30
Interestingly enough, the phrase Blitzkrieg is not even present within Truppenführung and
various historians contend that there was no groundbreaking innovation with the doctrine.
Rather, Truppenführung was a return to classic German operational thinking of Bewegungskrieg,
or war of movement. This war of movement style was embraced throughout European history
by commanders such as Fredrick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke. To the interwar leaders of
the Wehrmacht, the return to the war of movement would solve the challenges of attrition
warfare and once again lead to decisive victories. 31
Another important aspect of the development of Blitzkrieg and debates regarding its
initial success, is the integration of technology and the development of Combined Arms Theory.
Dennis Showalter’s article “Armies, Navies, Air Forces: The Instruments of War,” examines the
military developments of the Allied and Axis powers between the World Wars. The fruitless
outcomes of campaigns during the First World War along with the development of new
technology, such as the tank and airplane, left a pressing need for militaries to rethink how they
fought. While the First World War represented a war of mass, the second represented a mass of
machines. Showalter asserts that Germany, perhaps on accident, developed the best answer to

29

“Truppenführung,” Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library | US Army Combined Arms Center, 1.
Accessed March 22, 2021. https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/carl/.

30
31

Ibid., 7, 57, 61.
Citino, “Beyond Fire and Movement,” 331.
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this problem during the interwar period, creating what we know as Combined Arms Theory. 32
Combined Arms Theory essentially draws from the lessons of the First World War by integrating
technological advancements such as the plane and tank and applying them to traditional German
fighting methods of mobility and mass of force at the point of contention.
The three technologies that morphed together to make Combined Arms Theory possible,
were the tank, the airplane, and the radio. Williamson Murray’s article, “German Army
Doctrine, 1918-1939,” emphasizes the role that tank commanders such as Heinz Guderian and
Oswald Lutz had in this development. Guderian believed that tanks were crucial to achieve
breakthroughs at points of contention and advocated for the development of a separate tank
force. Under General Oswald Lutz, the Wehrmacht created tank units into independent fighting
forces that eventually developed into entire panzer armies. The role of these independent units
was to concentrate firepower rabidly, deliver sudden blows, and exploits breaches along the
enemy's front. 33 The Luftwaffe Army Support Doctrine was another key element of technology
integration by the Germans. James Corum‘s article, “The Luftwaffe‘s Army Support Doctrine,
1918-1941,” emphasizes the role that airplanes had in Combined Arms Theory. This Army
Support Doctrine called for a spirit of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and ground forces and
required pilots to be familiar with the operations of the Wehrmacht rather than act as a separate
entity. The development of the Stuka dive-bomber was another example of the German emphasis
of Combined Arms Theory. Corum cites the successful coordination of the Luftwaffe’s Stuka

Dennis Showalter, “Armies, Navies, Air Forces,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War,
ed. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 556–584.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cho9781139855969.024.
32

33

Murray, “German Army Doctrine,” 75-83.
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dive-bombers during the Polish, French, and Barbarossa campaigns where the Luftwaffe struck
in mass to deliver decisive blows to Allied air forces still on the ground. 34
The final technological aspect that tied armor and airpower together and allowed
cooperation was radio and communication. The only way for the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht to
act in cohesion across the levels of war, is via direct communication. Robert Citino contends
that the Wehrmacht's integration of radio was the real breakthrough in interwar doctrine. He
argues that the German army was the first to realize that the radio was indispensable, as it solved
the problem of operational indecisiveness by providing a direct line of communication between
commanders and frontline forces. 35 While the Luftwaffe was not able to develop radios that
directly communicated with ground forces, they did use panels, smoke, flares and lights to
coordinate targets. During the French campaign of 1940, Luftwaffe leaders attached officers to
armored command posts who could receive information reports from the frontlines. These
situation reports then were relayed to Air Corps command posts who could transform the
information into attack orders within minutes. 36
The development of combined arms theory along with return to nineteenth century
German military thinking of mobile warfare perhaps indicates the origins of Blitzkriegs success.
Historians, however, have wrestled with the myths regarding its initial success. Karl-Heinz
Frieser’s book, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, argues that there was no
predetermined doctrine to led to victory in France during the 1940 campaign. Instead, the Blitz
was an all or nothing improvised gamble that was born out of necessity. After its initial success

James Corum, “The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941,” Journal of Military History, 59,
no. l (Jan 1995): 56.
34

35
36

Citino, “Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle,“ 27
Corum, “Luftwaffe“P. 69-70
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in France, the euphoria of victory convinced Hitler and German military leaders they had found a
war winning strategy. When this plan was replicated again during Operation Barbarossa, its
initial success eventually stalled out and the Germans were never able to take back the
initiative. 37 Other historians have also debunked the myth that the Wehrmacht was an elite
motorized fighting force. Richard Overy’s chapter “A War of Engines” in his book Why the
Allies Won also argues that Wehrmacht forces were not qualitatively and quantitatively superior
to their opponents. While the Wehrmacht was considered one of the most modern armies in the
world, they were not the invincible mobile force that many have come to perceive. Overy argues
that in many cases, the Germans were under armed throughout the war, as modernization was
only focused on a small portion of the army and a great portion of the ground forces still relied
on horseback. 38
The myth of a highly mechanized German fighting force and the predetermined doctrine
of Blitzkrieg leaves one to ask: Where did this misconception come from? Karl-Heinz Frieser
argues that in part it was Western Allies own misconceptions that forged the myth. 39 Another
Frieser article, “The War in the West, 1939-1940,” notes that the legend was created after the
war's conclusion by historians who molded a fictional story of the Blitzkrieg strategy. 40 Historian
Roger Beaumont is also critical of Blitzkrieg's success. In an article published in the July 1986
edition of Military Review, Beaumont contends that the Wehrmacht only defeated second class
armies and was not as proficient as scholars and military thinkers were giving them credit for. 41

37
38

Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 412.
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Random House, 2006), 210.

Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 563.
Karl-Heinz Frieser, “The War in the West, 1939-1940,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World
War, ed. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 287-288.
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Other historians have pushed back on arguments like Beaumont's, often citing the success of the
1940 French campaign. Historian Lloyd Clark’s analysis of the invasion of France, Blitzkrieg:
Myth, Reality, and Hitler‘s Lightning War, examines how the fall of France was not a
predetermined outcome due to superior qualitative and quantitative German forces. 42 Clark
argues that it was rather the French inability to grasp modern mobile concepts of war that led to
disaster, as they heavily invested in fighting of a war of attrition by building up the Maginot
Line. Clark also cites the German ability to determine the French military’s weaknesses and
exploit them.43
In conclusion, this chapter sums up origins of Blitzkrieg and the historiographical
arguments about its initial success. Regardless of the criticisms of historians such as Frieser and
Beaumont of Blitzkrieg doctrine, it is undeniable that the 1940 French campaign and the initial
victories of the Germans integrated traditional German fighting methods with technological
advancements. While this was not a written predetermined strategy, the Wehrmacht's ability to
envision and implement this new style of warfare shocked militaries who had never seen or
prepared for it. Like a high-powered offense that can set the tone of an American football game,
the Wehrmacht's successful invasion of France set the standard for victory throughout the war.
From 1940 on, the war was characterized by mass of force, Combined Arms Theory, aggressive
thrusts at the point of contention, and mass encirclements of troops. As Citino states, the rest of
the war can be viewed as efforts by the Allied forces to combine their own principles with
German “lighting war” to create a new synthesis. 44 In this next chapter, I will further build off

Clark, Blitzkrieg, 174.
Ibid.
44
Citino, “Blitzkrieg to Airland Battle,” 5.
42
43
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the United States desire to learn from Blitzkrieg, and what this looked like in practice during the
war and immediately following the post-war years.
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CHAPTER 2. THE GREAT STRUGGLE
Mechanized and Mobile Warfare During World War Two
The rapid successes of the Wehrmacht’s military campaigns during 1940 and 1941
defined the standard in how the rest of the war was fought. The days of long grinding wars of
stagnation and attrition were replaced with the need for mobility, speed, breakthroughs, and mass
encirclements of enemy forces. In the last chapter, I demonstrated how the Blitzkrieg was not a
new innovative style of war, but rather a return to nineteenth century German military doctrine
integrated with new technologies like the tank, airplane, and radio. What the Wehrmacht lacked
in quality and quantity, they made up for with a modern approach to warfare that Allied forces
had never seen or prepared for. German tank commanders, such as Heinz Guderian, took this a
step further by using principles laid out in Truppenführung by seizing the initiative and driving
his panzers further into France. Despite orders from his superior officers, Guderian took
advantage of the disorganized French response, pressed on without infantry support, and
effectively cut off the French and British forces concentrated in Northern France and Belgium.
The rapid success of the assault completely broke French morale. On May 15, 1940, The French
prime minister, Paul Reynaud, telephoned Winston Churchill to inform him that the French were
defeated. 45
In this chapter I will show how the shocking success of Blitzkrieg impacted American
military doctrine during the war. I will start with the United States and other Allied nations
commitment to modernize and motorize their fighting forces, while also seeking the formula for
a quick decisive victory. Though Allied armies like the United States and the Red Army became
better equipped for mobile warfare than their German adversaries, they never achieved the
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operational superiority that the Wehrmacht demonstrated in 1940 and 1941. After establishing
how the United States military adapted to fight during the Second World War, I will show how
they sought to learn from the Wehrmacht after the war and into the Cold War era. Using a
collection of 213 former Wehrmacht officer’s reports from the war consolidated by the United
States Army Historical Division, I will demonstrate the potential lessons the Wehrmacht and
their Blitzkrieg principles offered. As the situation with the Soviet Union deteriorated and all out
warfare became likely, these lessons became crucial to American military doctrine. Though
another large scale mobilized war never materialized, the United States military continued to
show an interest in learning from the Wehrmacht's actions during the war. I will prove this by
examining studies and interrogations conducted by American officers. Along the way, I will
continue to integrate the historiographical conversations regarding the Wehrmacht's influence on
the United States military.
The shocking success of the German Blitzkrieg was immediately recognized by Allied
leaders. British prime minister Winston Churchill and field marshal Bernard Montgomery both
expressed their respect for the high quality of German military leadership and training. Churchill
openly acknowledged that the British forces lacked the quality to face the Wehrmacht in an open
engagement on land. After the disaster at Dunkirk, Montgomery stated to a subordinate that
“within a month or two you are going to meet in battle a German lieutenant colonel who for the
last thirty years has given all his time every day in every week in every month to learning his job,
and you will not be able to take him on.” 46 In order to win this new modern war, the Allies
needed a new approach. Elliot Cohen’s article, “War Planning,” identifies three problems that
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the Allied forces needed to address. First was the integration of new military technology,
particularly air power and tank formations. The second was joint operations, or in other words,
the way in which two or more services engaged in close and equal cooperation. Finally, was the
problem of supreme command and the relationship between military planners and civilian
leadership. 47 As demonstrated in the first chapter, the Wehrmacht solved these issues in the
interwar and early phases of the war. The creation of elite panzer divisions separated from the
regular army, along with radio technologies used for cooperation between the Wehrmacht and
Luftwaffe, overcame Cohen’s first two issues. Adolf Hitler as the supreme commander of all
German military forces also largely eliminated internal pushback from the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW.)
The Wehrmacht perhaps prepared more accordingly for modern war in the interwar
period, while on the flip side, the United States and other Allied nations were forced to rapidly
adapt to the situation. Though the United States recognized the potential of air power in future
wars, at the start of World War Two they lacked a clear path forward how they would use it. By
1941, the United States still lacked a separate branch of the military for its air forces. 48 While
the United States was an industrial giant and the first motorized society in the world, they never
achieved the rapid success of mobile warfare that the Wehrmacht demonstrated in 1940 and
1941. Rather than utilizing the potential of mobile warfare, the United States military instead
opted to apply mass of military firepower against the enemy’s main battlefield force, and
discouraged commanders from conducting risky offensive maneuvers. 49 Perhaps the American
military did not fully embrace all the principles of Blitzkrieg during the war, but they did commit
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to making their armed forces the most modern and mobilized in the entire world. Richard Overy
points out that rather than committing to a small elite armored core like the Wehrmacht, the
United States opted to create an entirely mechanized and motorized army. In 1944 they
outproduced German truck production with almost 600,000 trucks compared to the Germans
88,000. 50
Not only did the American military commit to an entirely mechanized and mobilized
army, their strategic approach to applying mass of firepower also integrated Combined Arms
Theory. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this was the destruction of the Panzer Lehr
Division on July 25, 1944. At the height of the struggle for Normandy, American Thunderbolt
fighter-bombers and Flying Fortress bombers dropped over 3,000 tons of bombs upon the
already battle fatigued panzer division. The results were catastrophic and instrumental to the
Allies success in Normandy, as almost half of the Panzer division was lost in the barrage, the
next day Allied armor swept aside the remnants of the elite Wehrmacht force. 51 In many ways
the destruction of the Panzer Lehr division at Normandy, resembled the daring Luftwaffe attacks
during the invasion of France and Operation Barbarossa. Using mass of firepower at a key point
of contention, the American air forces effectively destroyed a renowned German Panzer division.
The remaining soldiers of the division were shell shocked and disorganized like the French were
in 1940, as communication lines were severed during the attack. The air corps' devastating
attack in coordination with infantry and armor paved essentially paved the way for victory during
the Normandy campaign.
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The shocking display of firepower by the American’s during the Normandy campaign
was arguably influenced by Combined Arms Theory principles displayed by the Wehrmacht in
1940 and 1941. One striking example of the American military integrating modern technology
like the airplane into Combined Arms Theory is the army air corps strategic development during
the war. From 1940 on under General Hap Arnold, the army air corps developed a multi-purpose
air force intended to conduct strategic bombing, large-scale transport, air defense, and tactical air
support. Richard Overy acknowledges this is his book Why The Allies Won, citing the
widespread understanding that aircraft was the key ingredient of the German success. In
American Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s own words, “Air power has decided the fate of
nations; Germany with her powerful air armadas has vanquished one foe after another.” 52
Statements by American leaders like Henry Stimson indicate the Allied recognition of the
success of Blitzkrieg. As the war dragged on, the United States and other Allied nations
attempted to mimic the Wehrmacht's military achievements in more ways than one.
Another key technological aspect of Combined Arms Theory that the Americans
embraced regarding Blitzkrieg’s success was the radio. By 1941, American air forces began
experimenting with a system for close-support tactics for ground forces. The key to this
approach was similar to the Wehrmacht's close support with the Luftwaffe. By achieving air
superiority, American air forces hoped to achieve an adjunct to mechanized ground forces to
help push ground forces forward. Richard Overy indicates that initially this had mixed results, as
the Americans did not have the means for Army commanders to communicate with air force
commanders like the German’s did. During the North Africa campaign in 1941 and 1942, the
Allied system of communication between ground and air forces proved disastrous. Army unit
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requests for air support took so long to arrive that requesting it at all became almost pointless.
After the conclusion of the North African campaign, the Americans decided to revamp their
communication systems. As a result, the Americans created a new central air command that
worked in tandem with army commanders. The mission of this new approach was to neutralize
enemy air power first, attack supply and troop movements, and attack critical points on the
battlefield. 53 These functions resemble the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe’s relationship during the
early phases of the war and again emphasize the Americans desire to emulate Blitzkrieg.
Another important development to touch on for this project is the Red Army’s struggle
with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front. The rapid early success of Operation Barbarossa in
1941 almost completely wiped-out Soviet tank and air forces. The numerical advantage that the
Soviets had over the Wehrmacht was overcome by the shocking success of Blitzkrieg. With the
country on the brink of collapse, the Soviets were forced to overhaul their approach to warfare. 54
Like the Americans, the Soviets opted to adopt principles that resembled Blitzkrieg. New Soviet
mechanized forces combined two tank corps with a rifle division to create tank armies. These
tank armies operated in similar fashion to the Wehrmacht's Panzer cores, combining tanks,
infantry and supporting arms. The Soviets were able to out produce the Germans in terms of
tank production, and by 1943 they were almost three times larger than the German forces. 55 The
tank armies also adopted of a key tenant of the success of Blitzkrieg, as they were designed to
punch hard at the weak points of the enemy, create penetration of enemy lines, and then finally
exploit armored breakouts with sweeping pincer movements. At the battles of Stalingrad and
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Kursk, the Soviets displayed these principles with sweeping success. 56 One could argue that in
some ways, the Soviets emulated Blitzkrieg in a more successful fashion than the Americans.
Soviet military command, like the Americans, also recognized the crucial integration of
air power into this new mechanized approach to warfare. The Soviet’s understanding of German
success in the war runs parallel with American ideas, acknowledging the necessity of air power
with close coordination with ground forces. As a result, they also adopted a Luftwaffe style
approach of concentrating air power at the critical point of attack, in contrast with their decision
to spread forces out across the vast Eastern front in 1941. 57 Following the standard set by
coordination between the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, the Soviets also placed their air forces
under a centralized command structure. Under the leadership of general Alexander Novikov, the
Soviet air forces organized themselves after the Luftwaffe‘s air fleets, consolidating bombers,
fighters and ground attack planes into a single attack force. Once assigned to critical points on
the front, these air armies came under direct command of local commanders in order to achieve
close collaboration with ground forces. 58 The development of Soviet air and tank armies
modeled after the Wehrmacht's smaller elite mobile forces shows that, like the Americans, the
Soviet's recognized and desired to emulate the Blitzkrieg’s success.
Allied military victories on the Eastern front at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943 and in
Normandy in 1944 demonstrated that the Allies embraced select principles of Blitzkrieg and
applied them on the battlefield. The American and Soviet commitment to build modern mobile
forces, apply mass of firepower at the point of contention, and integrate technology like the
airplane and radio to Combined Arms Theory, resembles the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg in the early
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stages of the war. Despite all this, the Allies still never achieved a swift and decisive victory to
secure the end of the war like the Germans did in France in 1940. The Soviets perhaps came the
closet with Operation Bagration in summer 1944, but were still unable to deliver the knockout
blow. After the triumph in Normandy in the summer of 1944 and despite German forces in
complete disarray, the war dragged on for almost another year. Arguably, this was because the
Allies, particularly the Anglo-American coalition, did not fully grasp the principles the
Wehrmacht displayed throughout the war. As stated, earlier American commanders were not
encouraged to take risky maneuvers that were part of the formula for Blitzkrieg. Historians like
Robert Citino have even argued that the Americans did not achieve operational superiority
compared to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. 59
Citino supports his assertion of poor operational planning and coordination by the AngloAmerican coalition during the Sicily campaign and the Omaha beach landings. The invasion of
Sicily, Operation Husky, was a disaster from the start. Airborne troops who were dropped in the
dead of night were scattered around the island, with many drowning after falling into the sea.
The overall Allied commander for the operation, Sir William Harold Alexander, put American
forces under Patton in a mere support role as British Field Marshall Montgomery’s forces were
tasked with slugging it out with the main German force. Montgomery took a cautious and
systematic approach in an operation that required dashing and speed, and after four weeks he was
only halfway to his objective of the Sicilian town of Messina. The slow movement of
Montgomery’s forces and the unnecessary drive of Patton’s forces around the island allowed the
bulk of the German forces to retreat to the Italian peninsula. 60 Though the Allies were
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eventually successful in securing Sicily, their operational planning and Montgomery's failure to
seize the initiative squandered any chance of the Allies obtaining a decisive battlefield victory
against the Germans.
Citino also cites the Operation Overlord landings as an example of poor interservice
cooperation by the American forces. Operation Overlord was one of the most ambitious military
campaigns of all time, simultaneously attacking five beach fronts at once and using airborne
troops behind enemy lines, the Allies intended to open an entire second front on Hitler‘s western
flank. Most of the landings went over smoothly, but at Omaha beach the 1st and 29th infantry
divisions were pinned down by an entire division of German infantry. Due to the planners of the
Omaha landings decision to attack at low tide, and their reliance exclusively on air support, the
1st army division was left exposed on the open killing grounds of the beach. Despite the odds
stacked against them, the American forces gathered their courage and pushed inland. Though it
was a significant victory, it came at a high cost, as over two thousand Americans were lost. 61
While the Allies did commit to integrating new technologies like the airplane and tank into
Combined Arms Theory, they were not able to obtain a swift decisive victory in Normandy.
Citino points out that the Normandy campaign proved to be a drawn-out slug fest. At the French
city of Caen, British forces under Field Marshall Montgomery became bogged down for almost
two months. Though the Allied forces eventually broke through the German defenses around
Caen and trapped remaining German forces in the Falaise pocket, it came with a high price of
human life. The Falaise pocket operation was largely an operational mishap as well. Poor
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interservice cooperation between American and British-Canadian forces led to a failure to
complete the encirclement, and large numbers of Germans escaped. 62
Even after the Allied breakout in Normandy, the war with the Germans dragged on until
the Spring of 1945. The Allies successfully integrated modern technologies like the tank, plane,
and radio into Combined Arms Theory, but never achieved the operational superiority that the
Germans displayed in France in 1940. Anglo-American commanders seemed to lack any sort of
conception or idea of how to pull off an envelopment of enemy troops. Instead, they opted to
simply drive the Germans back toward the German border rather than seeking to trap and destroy
them in France. The Germans even displayed flashes of their success with Blitzkrieg in the final
years of the war, repelling the Allies offensive during the Market Garden campaign in September
1944, and surprising them with their counter offensive in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge
in 1944-1945. Eventually Nazi Germany collapsed under the sheer might of the Anglo-American
forces in the west and the Soviets in the east. Even as the war ended, however, American
military leaders recognized there was still much to learn from the Wehrmacht. Over the next
fifty years, military leaders and historians alike returned to the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg attacks to
draw lessons from the Second World War.
The American postwar desire to continue to learn from the Wehrmacht is perhaps best
indicated by the United States Army Historical Division’s collection of German officers' reports
from 1945 to 1961. The reports are vast and comprehensive, made up of over twenty-four
volumes and covering subjects from OKW command structure, tank warfare, and various
Wehrmacht campaigns including France and Russia. Initially, the historians assigned to this
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project sought to analyze the Wehrmacht's understanding of the war between the AngloAmerican coalition on the Western front. They not only wanted to understand planning and
execution of operations, but also give a fuller account of German defense, casualties, and
hundreds of other details regarding the Wehrmacht's operations. 63 As the postwar political
situation with the Soviet Union deteriorated, and another global war seemed likely, the project
shifted its focus to German operations against the Soviet Union. Volume fifteen, for example, is
entirely dedicated to analyzing operations on the Eastern front. The lessons learned from these
studies were rigorously studied by military minds and historians alike and had a direct impact on
the development of American military doctrine during the Cold War.
Historians who have examined the reports tend to agree that the likelihood of a war with
the Soviets led to an American desire to learn from the Wehrmacht's experiences in Russia.
Robert Hutchinson’s article, “The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the U.S. Army
Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1954-1946,” acknowledges the situation with the
Soviets as a driving factor for the study. 64 Hutchinson indicates that German officers were
willing to share this information with their former adversaries, as many of them still viewed the
Soviet‘s and Communism as an ideological enemy. The drawback from this was that many of
the reports were littered with National Socialist themes of racism and anti-Bolshevism while also
canonizing the myth of a “clean” Wehrmacht. 65 Despite this bias, American military officials
viewed these experiences as invaluable in crafting a war winning strategy against the Soviets. 66
James Wood’s article, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History
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Program, 1945-1961,” also acknowledges the situation with the Soviets as a driving factor of the
program. Wood cites the Berlin Blockade crisis in 1948-49 as a key turning point in the
emphasis of the program to focus on the Wehrmacht's experiences against the Soviets. As a
result, historical narratives of the war in the West were largely replaced by “how to” manuals on
fighting the Red Army. 67
Although the criticisms by Hutchinson and Wood regarding the National Socialist bias
within the reports are warranted, lessons of Blitzkrieg are also evident throughout the reports.
Volumes four through six focus heavily on OKW command structure and consist largely of
German officer’s critiques of Hitler’s meddling as a supreme commander and the German’s
commitment to mobilized warfare. General Walter Warlimont’s report on the German high
command describes Hitler’s role in diminishing the authority of the Wehrmacht high command
while also forcing onto to them the “irrevocable decision” to attack Poland, Norway, France, and
Russia. Statements like these and other German generals must be met with skepticism. Only
one of the German officers recruited was a trained historian and their biases against Bolshevism
and the Soviets impacted the reports. General Halder also specifically requested that the officers
write their reports in a way that blamed the Wehrmacht shortcomings on the dead Hitler, and not
the alive officers. 68 Warlimont went on to explain how the commitment to “lighting war” after
1941 hurt the OKW’s command structure even further. 69 Warlimont’s statements were not the
only example of German commitment to mobile warfare. Lieutenant General Gustav Hoehne’s
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report, “Fast mobile and armored forces,” also emphasized the OKW‘s commitment to creating a
mobilized force. Hoehne explained in detail the German conceptions of this mobilized force and
how it developed during the interwar period. This force not only required that the motor vehicle
become an integral part of the army, but also called for new, fresh conceptions of leadership. 70
Hoehne’s report was significant to American military doctrine in that in provided details
on how Blitzkrieg worked on an operational level. The report described the role of these mobile
forces in delivering decisive strikes, making speedy use of their success, and relying on modern
equipment, first-class training, and hand-picked personnel to win battles. Hoehne also embraced
the role of the airplane in the future of warfare, and explained that for mobile warfare to work,
close cooperation with the air force was absolutely required. 71 The emphasis on first-class
training and quick instincts of commanding officers was a key lesson of Blitzkrieg gained from
reading the German military studies. Hoehne explained the necessity of leaders in mobile units
to not only become masters of their equipment, but also educated in tactical situations.
Commanders were required to have sufficient experience in actual war service, tactical
comprehension of the situation, and a capacity for delivering positive and reliable results at the
point of contention. 72 For the Wehrmacht, it was not just the commitment to mobile warfare that
ensured Blitzkrieg's success, but also the ability of its officers to seize the initiative during battle.
Volume seven of the World War Two German Military Studies consisted of the OKW
war diaries, and provided feedback on multiple Wehrmacht campaigns including Poland, France,
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and Operation Barbarossa. These reports were significant for the development of the American
understanding of Blitzkrieg, as they provided direct feedback into the German perspective of the
reasons for their swift decisive victories. German general Helmuth Greiner reflected on the
campaigns in the report, starting with the birth of Blitzkrieg during the Polish campaign in
September 1939. Greiner indicated the uncertainty of the operation among various German
generals, but Hitler’s determination to make war with Poland marked an important test for the
Wehrmacht. Speed was the essential factor in defeating the Polish forces. Two separate attack
wedges were to drive to the Vistula and the Narew rivers, while commanders were required to
adjust themselves to new situations and Polish forces were to be knocked out immediately. This
speedy armored thrust was supplemented with overwhelming support from the Luftwaffe
designed to break the nerve of the Poles. 73 The operation was carried out as planned, the only
surprise was the unbelievably short amount of time of the operations success in nineteen days.
Greiner reflects that the Wehrmacht had passed their test, and as a result, Hitler felt they were up
to the task of any order he intended to give. 74
Greiner also provided a detailed report of the background and execution of Fall Gelb
(Case Yellow), the 1940 invasion of France. Like the Polish campaign, leaders of the OKW
were skeptical of the implications of the campaign. Greiner emphasized Hitler’s direct oversight
of the planning, and once again the supreme commander was demanding a quick decisive
campaign. Hitler was confident in the superiority of the German forces, particularly the
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Luftwaffe. 75 Like Poland, the operation unfolded with surprising success and speed. As German
forces crashed into Belgium, the best of the French and British forces moved north to face them.
The trap was set just as German strategists presumed. Armored forces under Heinz Guderian
unexpectedly burst through the Ardennes Forest in a massed concentrated effort. Supplemented
by Luftwaffe air support, Guderian caught the French totally disorganized and took advantage of
the situation by driving to the English Channel. Greiner once again stressed how the swift
victory filled the Germans with enthusiasm and satisfaction. The German victory was possible
by the concentrated thrusts of armored and motorized forces, along with flexible leaderships and
excellent support by the Luftwaffe. Consequently, the success played into Hitler‘s own ego and
gave the German people the idea that Hitler was a great military commander. 76 The ultimate test
for the German Blitzkrieg had yet to come, as Hitler‘s next great gamble meant an invasion of
the vast Soviet Union.
Operation Barbarossa was arguably one of the most ambitious military campaigns of all
time. While the Wehrmacht knocked out the French and Polish armies in quick fashion, the
Soviet Union had far more ground to cover and a quantitative advantage in manpower and
industry. Once again, Hitler called for a swift and decisive campaign, and believed the campaign
would take no longer than four months. 77 Greiner contended that by this point the Army High
Command were immersed in the success of Blitzkrieg and were convinced a swift victory was
possible. Looking back, Greiner recognized that the Germans underestimated various obstacles,
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including the enormous size of Russian territory, traffic and climate conditions, and the
endurance and toughness of the Russian population. 78 Despite these obstacles, Operation
Barbarossa had stunning initial success. Using three concentrated thrusts in the north, center,
and south of the Soviet Union, the Germans once again caught their opponents completely off
guard. The Luftwaffe was crucial to initial success, wiping out almost two thousand Soviet
planes in the first hours of the invasion. 79 The rapid advance into the Soviet Union, however,
perhaps exposed the weaknesses of Blitzkrieg warfare. Driving hundreds of miles into Soviet
territory stretched German supply lines, and as Soviet resistance hardened, German casualties
piled up. As Army Group Center under Heinz Guderian became bogged down at Smolensk,
Hitler made a fateful decision to divert armor to the south to speed up the invasion of Ukraine.
While this move contributed to the fall of Kiev, it bought the Soviets valuable time as heavy
rains bogged down the rapid advance of German forces. 80
As the Russian winter set in during December 1941, it froze not only the ground, but also
the German Blitzkrieg. The Germans, overconfident after their initial success were not prepared
for the conditions of winter warfare. With priority given to fuel and ammunition, troops lacked
winter supplies, leading many to freeze to death. 81 Too make matters worse, the Soviets
launched a surprise counterattack on the Germans threatening the outskirts of Moscow in the
early morning of December 5, 1941. 82 The counterattack under the command of general G.K.
Zhukov was a display of the Soviet‘s newfound understanding of Blitzkrieg warfare. Using
concentrated mobile attacks, the Soviets attacked the Germans across the front and poured
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armored units into gaps created by the infantry assault. Through the month of December,
Wehrmacht forces were pushed back and both forces were pushed to the point of exhaustion.
Despite advice from his top military advisors, Hitler issued his famous “stand-fast-order“ and
commanded German soldiers to hold their positions to the death. 83 Hitler‘s orders perhaps
signified that the war in the East was determined to be a drawn-out bitter war. Despite the
failure of the German Blitzkrieg, the pace for the rest of the war with the Soviets was defined by
its principles. Across the vast expanse of the Soviet Union, battles were defined by rapid armor
movements at points of contention, Combined Arms Theory, and mass encirclements of troops.
While reports gathered by the U.S. Army Historical Division on the invasions of France,
Poland, and Russia provided insight to the initial success of Blitzkrieg, volume fifteen of the
studies was entirely devoted to understanding the Eastern Theater. The emphasis on analyzing
the details of the German actions in the east are an important indication of the Americans desire
to learn from Blitzkrieg. As war with the Soviet Union appeared inevitable, it was crucial for the
Americans to gain any sort of advantage over their next potential opponent. Volume fifteen of
the German Military Studies includes a complete analysis of the Blitzkrieg campaigns and the
lessons the Americans could learn from them. In an analysis of the Polish campaign written by
United States Army Major Robert Kennedy, the officer sums up several of the key learning
points of the Blitzkrieg campaign. Most notable are Kennedy’s assertions that the German war
of movement had ended the era of static warfare marked by World War One. 84 Other lessons
that Major Kennedy recognized were the efficacy of the German organization of concentrated
armor and air units, the training of Wehrmacht soldiers to act with aggressive action, and in the
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interservice cooperation of the Luftwaffe with ground forces. 85 American military studies such
as Major Kennedys indicate a clear desire to learn from the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg, a trend
that would continue throughout the Cold War.
Volume fifteen also includes a manuscript of an interrogation of German general Franz
Halder. The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Cosse Brissac, who recognized
Halder as one of the masters of the German military art. 86 Brissac‘s interview went in depth on
the strategic aims of Barbarossa, like the previously mentioned reports, Halder indicated the
desire to strike fast, destroy enemy forces in encirclement battles, and maintain aerial superiority
of Russian airspace. 87 Like many German generals reflecting on the operational developments
on the Eastern front, Halder too criticized Hitler’s meddling in strategic affairs. One of the major
critiques was Hitler’s decision to transfer four panzer divisions from Army Group South. This
left Halder concerned for the northern and southern flanks of German forces fighting for
Stalingrad, a concern that came to fruition in November 1942. Despite Halder’s warnings to
Hitler, the General was relieved of his post on September 24, 1942 and was never recalled back
to active duty for the remainder of the war. 88 The interviews of German commanders like Franz
Halder not only shaped the American understanding of the conflict with the Soviets, but also
gave them crucial insight into the successes and failures of the German Blitzkrieg.
American military studies like Robert Kennedys and interrogations like Cosse Brissac’s
indicated a clear desire on the part of the Americans to learn from the success of Blitzkrieg
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campaigns. While the Army Historical Divisions studies and interviews of the Wehrmacht
perhaps played into the myths of a clean Wehrmacht, the lessons learned provided valuable
operational lessons that shaped how the Americans could win an all-out war with the Soviet
Union in Europe. 89 While the American military embraced the integration of armor and planes
into Combined Arms Theory, they still did not fully grasp the principles that made the early
German Blitzkrieg successful. Arguably, the Soviet Union grasped these principles better than
the Americans and British. In the World War Two German Military Studies collection, German
commanders articulated the need to strike decisively at key points of contention, emphasize the
use of speed, and allow officers to act with intuition and aggression in their maneuvers. These
principles slowly would work their way into American military doctrine over the course of the
Cold War, and eventually led to the creation of Airland Battle Doctrine during the 1980s. In the
next chapter I will discuss the continued desire of the Americans to learn from Blitzkrieg, and
how these lessons were implemented over the course of the Cold War.
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CHAPTER 3. TRIAL, ERROR, AND SUCCESS
Evolution of American Military Doctrine during the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm
American military thinkers and historians alike continued to revisit lessons from the
Wehrmacht as the Cold War unfolded over the next forty years. The United States Army
Historical Division continued their interviews and research of former German officers until
1961, and their conclusions left a clear impact on American Military Doctrine. 90

I will

demonstrate in how many ways, the United States military sought to emulate the Wehrmacht
throughout Cold War conflicts and throughout the 1990s. There are several ways in which this
effort is undeniable. The first I will examine is the continued studies of the Army Historical
Division. Volume seventeen in particular exclusively features insights on the war in Russia, with
topics ranging from defensive improvisations against Red Army offensives to protecting logistic
networks over the vast space of the theater of war. Next, I will examine how the American
military fought during Cold War conflicts of containment. While the Americans did not achieve
decisive victory during these conflicts, they still drew lessons from the Wehrmacht and
attempted to achieve maneuver warfare. After the conclusion of theses indecisive conflicts, The
American military redesigned itself to create a more professional highly trained force that
emphasized maneuver warfare and interservice cooperation.
Finally, I will examine the development of the Air-Land Battle doctrine in the 1980s.
This doctrine was put into practice via Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and Air-Land Battle is
recognized as the conceptual basis of its success. 91 By comparing Air-Land Battle principles
with those in Truppenführung, I will show how the Americans desired to emulate the success of
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the Wehrmacht's early Blitzkrieg campaigns. These campaigns are characterized by lightningfast mobile strikes, inter-service coordination, intuitive leadership, and swift decisive results with
minimal loss of life. During the Gulf War, the United States and their allies achieved all these
principles, beating Saddam Hussein’s regime in roughly one hundred days. In more ways than
one Operation Desert Storm resembles the success of early Blitzkrieg campaigns, particularly the
1940 invasion of France. The NATO coalition struck with lighting speed and aggressiveness,
concentrating an armored thrust at a heavily fortified opponent across seemingly impassable
terrain. They also displayed effective interservice cooperation, complimenting a concentrated
armor attack with a massive air offensive that crippled the enemy’s supply and communication
networks. 92 Like the Germans in France during the Fall Gelb campaign, the Americans executed
a daring offensive using an integration of the latest technology to decisively defeat the enemy.
In the years following World War II, the United States military anticipated that a largescale conflict in Central Europe with the Soviet Union was inevitable. This is a trend that
continued throughout the entirety of the Cold War and influenced the evolution of American
military doctrine heavily. Seeking to gain any sort of advantage against the Red Army, U.S.
military leaders saw the study of the strengths and weaknesses of Russian infantry as a
necessity. 93 The best available source to draw from was the former Wehrmacht officers working
with the Army Historical Division. Even though the Wehrmacht lost to the Red Army,
American military thinkers still saw the Germans information as invaluable. Most likely, this is
due to the similar strategic situations the United States would find themselves in if a large-scale
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war in Europe erupted. Robert Hutchinson acknowledges that by 1949 the U.S. Army began to
see its strategic position as similar to the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front in 1943. 94 In the event
of a Soviet invasion of western Europe, the Americans assumed they would be fighting a
defensive battle against an opponent that heavily outmanned and outgunned them on the
continent. As a result, volume seventeen of the U.S. Army Historical Division’s Wehrmacht
studies shifted from understanding the success of Blitzkrieg warfare, to analyzing the details of
defensive warfare against the Soviets.
By highlighting a few significant studies within volume seventeen, it is apparent the
Army Historical Division sought to gain some insight on fighting a defensive war against the
Red Army. A study published in 1951 by the Department of the Army supports this premise.
The contribution, “Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign,” consists of an
analysis by an anonymous former Wehrmacht general and focuses heavily on events from 19431945, specifically the German retreat from the Eastern Front into the northern plains of
Germany. 95 Chapter two of the study specifically focuses on defensive measures employed by
the Wehrmacht in the event of Russian offensives. These measures included tactical retreats by
German soldiers in the face of imminent attacks, and reforming in the rear into stronger and
more reinforced lines to face the enemy. The retreating Germans also employed demolitions
along their route of retreat to cause disruption to the advancing Red Army. 96 Another point of
interest in German defensive measures is the employment of fortress cities. By 1944,
Wehrmacht commanders were ordered to use towns and cities as makeshift fortresses by digging
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defensive lines and creating anti-tank positions. Soldiers were ordered to hold the towns at all
costs, and the approach often ended in the encirclement of German forces. The former
Wehrmacht commander was critical of this approach, however, arguing that preserving forces to
fight another day was more important that defending strategically insignificant towns. 97
Another noteworthy study that shows the desire to learn from Wehrmacht defensive
tactics is report NO. 20-234, “Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia.”
Published in January 1952, the report discusses tactical and logistical problems facing the
operations of encircled German forces. This knowledge was gained as a result of German
fortress cities and resulted in a trend of desperate last stands by German forces during the later
years of the war. The report also emphasizes the role of the Luftwaffe in these scenarios by
keeping encircled troops supplied, a goal that was rarely achieved. The Wehrmacht commander
evaluates several scenarios where German forces were encircled and attempts to draw lessons
from various breakthrough operations. 98 While the Wehrmacht failed in many of these battles of
encirclements, the American military still saw the lessons as invaluable in preparing to fight off a
potential Soviet invasion.
Perhaps the most significant study in volume seventeen, and one that indicates a direct
connection between German and American military doctrine, is study NO. 20-233, German
Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs. The 1951 study again draws from a nameless
former Wehrmacht officer who fought in the battles Kharkov and Belgorad. 99 The officer
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provides a detailed analysis of the German method of “Active Defense“ a relatively simple but
effective approach that employs counterattacks in response to Soviet offensives. The purpose of
Active Defense is to cut off forward advances of Red Army forces by launching a counterattack.
In order to do this, reserve forces are required to close the breach of Russian attacks. These
forces must be removed from the frontlines to ensure their maneuverability and must strike with
tremendous force and concentrated mass of firepower. Attempts must also be made to narrow
the breach by tactically withdrawing to a shorter line and reinforcing resistance adjacent to the
gap. 100 The description of the Wehrmacht‘s active defense method left a direct impact on
American military doctrine during the Cold War. In 1976, the U.S. Army adopted FM 100-5
Extended Battle, also known as active defense, as their official doctrine. I will cover the doctrine
in more detail later on, but the similarities to the German active defense methods are clear. At its
core, the doctrine calls for high mobility of reserve air and ground forces to quickly meet
attacking forces, using maneuver to concentrate forces at the right time and place. 101
Though studies from volume seventeen of the German military studies suggested the
United States were preparing for an all-out defensive war in Europe, the seemingly inevitable
never came. Instead, the Cold War evolved into a nuclear arms race and a series of smaller scale
wars of “containment.” As it became increasingly clear that the Soviets were committed to the
global spread of communism, the United States opted to prop up both democratic and nondemocratic anti-communist governments around the world. Nations that were jointly occupied by
Soviet and American forces, like Germany and Korea, became hotspots for Cold War
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tensions. 102 While the Americans surely thought the European front would explode at any
moment, Korea was actually the opening act of the containment wars of the larger Cold War.
While Korea is often referred to as a “forgotten war” it constituted an important transition and
lesson for the American military. In many ways the war was a bridgehead between the
conventional military doctrine of fighting decisive battles of World War Two and the United
States’ post-war commitment to conducting limited wars of containment. The opening phases of
the war featured highly mobile operations by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), United
Nations forces, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers, while the second half of the war devolved
into a static positional struggle of attrition. 103
The Korean War was a particular challenge for American military leaders, mainly for its
nature as a limited conflict. This conflict was limited in several ways: limited geographically to
the Korean Peninsula, limited in the number of resources committed to the conflict, and limited
too by public opinion concerning the conflict from around the world. 104 The war was also
unique in that it was the first time U.S. Army units served America and a broader United Nations
effort, a reoccurring theme that has emerged in American military incursions. 105 Initially
American military leaders stuck to their World War II approach of mass of firepower and
destruction of the enemy's main force. This approach, however, was not effective in the limited
nature of the Korean War. From the outset, most of the Army’s divisions had major equipment
shortages and personnel barely reached 70 percent of their full strength. Coupled with a war
weary American public, a constrained budget, and congressionally imposed personnel strength
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ceilings, the American military entered the Korean peninsula unprepared for the conflict. As a
result, the army sustained significant casualties during the initial phases of the war during the
summer of 1950. 106
Despite its nature as limited war, there still seems to be indication that certain American
military commanders sought to fight an aggressive style conflict that in some ways emulated
Blitzkrieg. Douglass MacArthur's Inchon counterattack is perhaps the best example. After a
series of victories by the NKPA, the Americans and their South Korean Allies were pushed back
to the south eastern corner of the peninsula. Like the Wehrmacht during operation Barbarossa,
the NKPA’s rapid offensive success stretched their supply lines to their limits, making them
vulnerable to American airpower. MacArthur, recognizing the NKPA’s vulnerability and
utilizing American air superiority cooked up a plan to catch the North Koreans off guard and
retake Seoul. Using an amphibious assault that resembled Wehrmacht pincer movements during
World War Two, American marines would swing around the Korean Peninsula and crash into
the North Korean flank at Inchon. 107 The plan was as daring as it was risky, but in the end
MacArthur’s assessment of the situation and decision to strike decisively caught the North
Koreans off guard. As with the German invasion of France in 1940, which confronted the
British with the choice of evacuating the continent or face destruction, the very success of the
American movement put the North Koreans in a similar dilemma: stay in the south and be cut off
and destroyed, or retreat hastily back up the peninsula.
Even with Seoul and South Korea liberated as a result of the Inchon landings, the war on
the Korean Peninsula was far from over. MacArthur planned to invade North Korea and crush
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the communist regime for good. Ignoring intelligence reports that Chinese soldiers were now
deployed in North Korea, MacArthur pushed his forces further into North Korea. At the battle of
the Chongchon river in late November 1950, outnumbered American forces were met by two full
Chinese armies of light infantry. Despite American technological superiority, the speed and
mobility of these light infantry units broke through decisive points along the front. The result
was the longest retreat in U.S. military history, before American forces eventually stabilized the
front roughly along the preexisting border. 108 The remainder of the war was largely fought over
the 38th Parallel, characterized by static positional warfare that contrasted the opening phases of
the war. Despite the war ending in a relatively inconclusive stalemate, the footprint of the
Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg was apparent throughout the duration of the conflict. The Inchon
landings indicated U.S. military leader's commitment, when and where feasible, to interservice
cooperation and aggressive flanking maneuvers. However, a growing rivalry between the
American Army and Airforce perhaps limited the full potential of Combined Arms Theory. This
rivalry is indicated by postwar Army studies that criticized the Air Force‘s failure to prevent the
enemy from deploying and maintaining large and effective land forces. Not surprisingly, since it
was prepared by the Army, the study ultimately concluded the United States was unprepared to
defeat the Communist threat due to its reliance on the Air Force and Navy. 109
MacArthur’s Inchon campaign is not the only evidence of the Wehrmacht's influence on
the conduct of the Korean War. The Army Historical Division collected over 900 reports from
Wehrmacht officers over the course of the Korean War. German doctrinal concepts such as
mobile defense were translated and delivered to every army unit down to the battalion level.
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American Field Service manual FM-100-5 illustrated the American respect for the opinions of
German officers. Numerous revisions were suggested in FM-100-5 including the combined arms
integration and mobile defense, principles that were implemented by the U.S. Army in 1954. 110
Wehrmacht officers also provided information and formed conceptions of how the Americans
were to fight irregular guerilla warfare. One brief specific example of this can be found in
volume seventeen. Study No. 20-240, “Rear Area Security In Russia: The Soviet Second Front
Behind German Lines,” covers in detail the struggle between the Wehrmacht and irregular
Russian partisans far behind the front lines of the Eastern Front. The German officer writing the
report put heavy emphasis the threat of partisans to supply lines, the need to have effective forces
in the rear to combat partisans, patrols and checkpoints along key roads and highways, and the
ruthlessness of mopping up partisan infected areas. 111 Based on the Wehrmacht's experience
fighting partisans along the Eastern Front, the U.S. Army Historical divisions collected dozens of
reports on guerilla warfare from former officers. By 1949 it had produced and distributed some
twenty-one monographs regarding German experiences with partisan warfare in the East. The
Army Historical Division also translated the Wehrmacht's 1944 field manual, “Fighting the
Guerilla Bands.” Hutchinson points out that while these reports had a direct impact on the 1951
U.S. Army publication FM-31-20 “Operations Against Guerrilla Forces,” they relied heavily on
German myths and biases against the Soviets. 112
Despite the impact of Wehrmacht officer reports that influenced the American military
during the Korean War, the United States never achieved a decisive victory resembling the
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Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns. Even though the Americans and their South Korean
Allies did not lose the war, the bloody stalemate left a bad taste in the mouths of U.S. military
commanders. The phrase “No more Koreas!” became a sort of slogan in the years following the
war. 113 On the operational level, the technologically superior American forces were outplayed by
light Chinese infantry who struck decisively and overwhelmingly at key points of contention.
Without overwhelming firepower from United Nations artillery and airpower, the U.S. forces
faced being completely routed. Robert Citino contends that perhaps the key takeaway from the
Korean War, was the importance of well trained and effective infantry. 114 The emphasis of
highly trained and professional infantry is a key aspect of the Wehrmacht’s success during World
War II, inflicting a 3-to-2 casualty ratio throughout most of the war. This disparity was largely
the result of German stress on Auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics. This mission-oriented
approach gave senior officers considerable freedom to act on their own initiative to achieve a
mission‘s goal, rather than following detailed specific orders. 115 That, of course, assumes welltrained junior officers and infantry who understand both the intent and limitations of an order,
and have the intrinsic motivation to carry them out. As a war with the Soviet Union appeared
almost inevitable during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States could not afford more
operational mishaps like what occurred during the Korean war.
While the stakes remained high between the United States and the Soviet Union into the
1960s and 1970s, an all-out conventional war between the superpowers never occurred. Instead,
the United States found itself in another limited war of containment in Southeast Asia. Much like
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the Korean War the United States entered Vietnam to stop the spread of Communism. Vietnam
was also an operational challenge for the U.S. military, as President Johnson’s commitment to
defend South Vietnam was contradicted by the initially limited deployment of manpower and
resources into the conflict. 116 The nature of warfare in Vietnam also proved a daunting challenge
for U.S. Army doctrine. By now, the American army was built to fight immense battles,
presumably against the Soviet Union, supported by Combined Arms firepower from fleets of
tanks and aircraft. In Vietnam they found themselves fighting guerillas that required light
infantry to patrol the dense jungles of Vietnam with the only reliable fire support being
mortars. 117 As a result, the war played out as a grinding war of attrition that eventually ended
with the United States pulling out of the country in 1973. The jungle terrain of the country and
the guerilla fighting style of the Viet Cong leveled the playing field against the technologically
superior American forces.
The Vietnam war is largely remembered as a disaster for the U.S. military. U.S. Army
Colonel David Hackworth recalls, “I felt we sent an army to Vietnam that was not prepared to
fight the war. I felt that we did not understand the nature of the war in the military.” 118 Geoffrey
Sloan also points out that on top of operational blunders of the military, the trauma of Vietnam
created a crisis of confidence between the military, the public, congress, and the executive
branch. 119 While there were indisputable shortcomings during the war, there were also some
critical operational developments. One major technological breakthrough was the utilization of
helicopter-borne assault forces. Designed to go anywhere and hit any objective without having to

Gaddis, Cold War, 132-133.
Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 229.
118
Sloan, “Doctrine,” 253.
119
Ibid., 253.
116
117

51

secure flanks, helicopter assaults became crucial to offensive maneuvers. 120 One striking
example of the offensive potential of helicopter assaults is Operation Pegasus during March of
1968. As U.S. Marines were trapped fighting in the city of Khe Sanh, the United States launched
a daring offensive to breakthrough to the marines. Using Combined Arms Theory principles, the
1st Calvary Division launched airmobile assaults via helicopter supplemented by rockets,
artillery, and aircraft. The operation had stunning success as American forces secured the
perimeter around Khe Sanh and reopened supply lines to the city in record time with low
amounts of casualties. 121 The successful employment of helicopter-borne assaults to relieve the
encircled marines at Khe Sanh was strikingly similar to the Wehrmacht's encirclement operations
studied by the Army Historical Division. Relief of encircled troops via air support proved to be
much more successful with the integration of the helicopter.
1973 was the year of a crucial crossroads in American military doctrine. The stalemate
ending of Korea and the defeat in Vietnam resulted in the U.S. military seeking reforms. Almost
immediately after the ceasefire between the Americans and the North Vietnamese in January
1973, the U.S. military established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Initially
under the command of General William De Puy, the most pressing matter addressed was how the
United States could apply its tremendous modern firepower on the battlefield to its own
advantage. 122 The same year the United States ended its conscription program, instead opting to
build an all-volunteer military force that was professionally trained. 123 The development of a
smaller volunteer based and professionally trained military force is comparable to the small
highly trained force General von Seeckt developed in Germany during the 1920s. However, this
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is not the only evidence of a fighting force influence by the Wehrmacht. Even though Du Puy
was one of the leading U.S. commanders during the Vietnam war, he drew on his experiences as
an officer in the European theater during World War Two. Du Puy was largely struck by the
unrealistic training of U.S. Army soldiers that left them unprepared for the battlefield in
comparison with the tactical excellence of the German Army. 124
The influence of the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg is clear on Du Puy and TRADOC. The
result of their discussions recognized the importance of operational-level warfare. No longer did
U.S. military planners cling to the idea that overwhelming force and firepower could grind down
the enemy as they had in pervious wars, they now recognized that there was an art to handling
the echelons above division. 125 The recognition of war as an art is perhaps a tip of the hat to the
Wehrmacht's Truppenführung doctrine during World War Two, with its first bullet point
describing war as an art, depending on free creative activity. 126 Du Puy also drew on the success
of the Israeli army during the “Six Day War” war in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in
1973. In both cases Israeli forces were outnumbered against an invading coalition force led by
Egypt and Syria. During the “Six Day War” in 1967 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a
surprise attack against Egyptian and Syrian forces. Like the Luftwaffe during the early Blitzkrieg
campaigns of France and Operation Barbarossa, the Israeli air forces completely wrecked the
Arab coalition's air forces within a few hours. At Sinai, an IDF armored assault crashed into
advancing Egyptian forces from the front and flanks supported by overwhelming firepower from
aircraft, the result was a disastrous rout of Egyptian forces. 127 The Yom Kippur War also
impressed Du Puy as once again the IDF displayed a masterful display of modern Combined
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Arms Theory and achieved results with limited casualties. Historians Geoffrey Sloan, Andrew
Gallo, and Robert Citino recognize that the timing of these conflicts was crucial to U.S. doctrine
in the 1970s and 1980s, as the IDF‘s strategic position of being outmanned and out gunned
resembled what a Soviet invasion of Central Europe might look like. 128
Under Dupuy’s leadership, the U.S. army underwent significant doctrinal changes. In
1976, the FM 100-5 Extended Battle, or “active defense” doctrine fundamentally changed the
Americans tactical doctrine of static defense. Active defense instead called on U.S. commanders
to move their units and rapidly apply force at key points on the battlefield. The design of this
tactical doctrine intended to give U.S. army forces a mobile defense capable of winning a battle
against numerically superior Warsaw Pact troops. 129 Du Puy and other TRADOC leaders
believed the defensive approach of the active-defense doctrine gave the Americans the ability to
fight outnumbered and win. 130 The employment of Active-Defense doctrine indicates a direct
connection with the German Active-Defense doctrine on the Eastern Front during the second half
of the war. It also perhaps indicates the recognition by U.S. military commanders of the similar
strategic positions of the NATO allies in central Europe and the Wehrmacht during World War
Two. The U.S. Department of Defense figures from the 1980s support this claim. NATO was
outnumbered in almost every category: 42,500 to 13,000 in main battle tanks, 31,500 to 10,750
in artillery and mortars, 78,800 to 8,100 antitank weapons, and finally 7,240 to 2,795 tactical
aircraft. 131
Despite the significant developments gained by Du Puy’s leadership, TRADOC did not
stop their revisions to American military doctrine with the Active Defense doctrine. TRADOC
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continued their brainstorming into the 1980s, when several military thinkers found problem with
the Active Defense doctrine. One major issue identified in the Active Defense Doctrine was that
for it to work, it depended on the enemy achieving a breakthrough at one point in the defensive
line in order for a concentrated counterattack to be launched against the enemy forces. It also
over emphasized the priority of winning the first battle, an approach that could cause the army to
ignore responses to situations that might be fundamentally different. 132 As a result, a new
doctrine was developed in 1982, AirLand Battle. The name emphasizes the primary purpose of
the doctrine, an integration of the three-dimensional nature of modern battle, infantry, armor, and
air warfare. 133 An important aspect of this doctrine was the integration of newer technology in
American military doctrine. Like the Germans during the interwar period, the Americans desired
to use new warfighting technology in innovative fashion to gain an advantage over their enemies.
Andrew Gallo identifies a “big-five” of these technologies, being the Abrams main battle tank,
the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk utility helicopter, and
the Patriot air defense system. 134
While there is no direct mention of Blitzkrieg within AirLand Battle’s official
publication, the similarities are obvious. The primary functions of the doctrine indicate a shift
from traditional American doctrine, with a shift to a focus on operational focus involving the
rapid movement of man and materials. 135 AirLand Battle in many ways resembles the principles
laid out in the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung manual that were vital to the early German success
in World War II. In the field manual describing the fundamentals of army operations, American
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officers are encouraged to take initiative, use agility and maneuverability, study historical
examples, and rely on close coordination with airpower for support. The manual also references
missions-based tactics encouraging officers to act independently within the framework of the
higher commander‘s intent. 136 The identical language used in AirLand Battle’s doctrine and the
references to missions-based tactics are clear evidence of the United States desire to emulate the
success of Wehrmacht's early Blitzkrieg campaigns. The reasoning behind this dramatic change
in doctrine was the Americans recognition of the similar strategic situation to the Wehrmacht in
Central Europe and their admiration for Blitzkrieg's early success.
Some historians have generally agreed that AirLand Battle was an attempt to recreate and
embody the success of the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg campaigns. A thesis written by James Curry,
a masters student at the University of Western Australia, in 2015 examines how the United States
attempted to emulate Blitzkrieg with the development of Airland Battle. Curry describes how in
many ways, Airland Battle was a major break from traditional US military doctrine that relied on
numerical superiority, firepower, and brute force. 137 A “Wehrmacht mystique” existed within
the U.S. army during the late Cold War, one in which the German army of World War Two was
viewed not only as a highly effective fighting force, but one worthy of emulating through
American military doctrine. 138 Curry provides further evidence of this ”Wehrmacht mystique”
within the U.S. military by citing the numerous articles written in the 1970s and 1980s in the
U.S. military‘s official journal, Military Review. There were dozens of articles written relating to
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the Wehrmacht from 1965 to 1995 and no less than sixteen were published that were devoted to
the Wehrmacht and its doctrine after the publication of Airland Battle in 1982. 139
Curry’s analysis of the “Wehrmacht mystique” and his review of Military Review
articles are not the only evidence of the American desire to emulate Blitzkrieg. Further evidence
of the American admiration includes studies conducted by American military officers
themselves. In 1991, United States Marine Corps officer, Major Marvin Knorr, wrote a thesis
analyzing the development of German doctrine from 1832-1945 and its application of supporting
arms. Major Knorr’s tone towards the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg is overwhelmingly positive,
citing the operational superiority of the Germans during the French campaign. 140 Knorr
concludes that while the Wehrmacht eventually broke down against the sheer might of the Allies,
the Germans displayed admirable operational success throughout the war. He attributes the
German Army’s effectiveness to the following: its style of command and control and its
offensive spirt, its experience during the interwar period, its training and leadership, the
cohesiveness between branches aided by communication, and the initiative that was built into its
officer corps. 141 Major Knorr’s conclusions are a clear example of how American officers
admired the operational superiority of the Wehrmacht. Citing the invasion of France as the peak
of operational success during the war, we can see the admiration for Blitzkrieg tactics.
Luke O’Brien’s article, “The Doctrine of Military Change: How The US Army Evolves,”
acknowledges the role of incubators within TRADOC (United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command) and how they impacted the development of Air-Land Battle. Incubators are
smaller subunits that exist outside of military bureaucracy, giving them the freedom to examine
Ibid., 28.
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future trends and problems and devise possible solutions. These incubators create networks that
provide intellectual forms for military leaders, and provide a platform for debate, critiques, and
improvements for military doctrine. 142 An example of one of these forums is the analysis of the
Wehrmacht in the Military Review articles mentioned by Curry. During the 1980s, these
incubators relentlessly focused on developing a doctrine capable of countering the Soviets in the
event of a European ground war. O‘Brien also reinforces the point that American incubators
desired to adopt a Blitzkrieg like doctrine, using Combined Arms Theory, maneuverability, and
mass of firepower at decisive points. O‘Brien also demonstrates the role these incubators played
in the further development of Air-Land Battle. Citing the further studies conducted at Fort
Leavenworth. These studies and their conclusions were then printed in publications such as
Infantry or Armor magazine. 143 In 1981, some of these theories were put into practice with the
opening of the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin California. Designed to give U.S.
forces the opportunity to prepare for the Soviet threat, the camp came with an opposition force
composed of armored Calvary built to resemble the Soviet army. 144
Though the United States and NATO prepared relentlessly for an all-out war with the
Soviet Union in Europe, the colossal struggle never materialized. By 1991, the Soviet Union
essentially collapsed from within, marking an end to the decades long Cold War. The United
States had prepared for over forty years for a confrontation in Europe, and in the meantime had
adopted Blitzkrieg like tactics with the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine. Though the
collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of one of the most bitter rivalries in modern history,
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it did not ensure a lasting peace. Instead, the United States found itself intervening against the
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein following his August 1990 decision to invade Kuwait. The
conflict gave the United States military a chance to use AirLand Battle in an actual conflict
instead of wargames. As a result, Operation Desert Storm unfolded as a modern-day Blitzkrieg
campaign, with the United States achieving one of its most successful military campaigns in
history. In the next few paragraphs, I will demonstrate how the United States operational success
against Iraq embodied Blitzkrieg and led to a decisive victory resembling the Wehrmacht's
invasion of France in 1940.
Historians largely agree that Operation Desert Storm contained all the elements of a
successful modern Blitzkrieg. Historian Omer Bartov declared that the American victory over
Saddam’s forces contained all the elements of a 1991-style Blitzkrieg citing the minimal
casualties, quick results, and massive destruction of the enemy that was achieved. 145 James
Curry also agrees that the success of Operation Desert Storm is comparable to the 1940 invasion
of France, citing the U.S. Army’s implementation of Air-Land Battle as a display of “lightning
war” 146 Robert Citino also alludes to Operation Desert Storm as a modern Blitzkrieg, and even
declares the operation as the most successful in U.S. military history. 147 United States military
commanders also praised the success of Operation Desert Storm and alluded to the influence of
Blitzkrieg. United States Air Force General Merrill McPeak praised the execution of Combined
Arms Theory, declaring “This was the first war in history in which air power was used to defeat
ground forces.” 148 These conclusions from a range of historians and military minds alike
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provide a solid foundation of how the American military executed a modern-day Blitzkrieg in
1991.
The origins of the Gulf war follow much the same pattern as Hitler’s decision to
aggressively expand in Europe. After decades of fighting Iran, the Ba’ath regime led by Saddam
Hussein in Iraq was on the brink of economic collapse. With the nationalistic regime now facing
growing opposition in their own country, Saddam made the decision to invade his small neighbor
to the southeast, Kuwait. Much of this decision stemmed from longstanding land disputes and
Saddam’s desire to secure oil. 149 Saddam’s regime was in a peculiar position geopolitically.
Remaining neutral throughout the Cold War and positioned in the strategic theater of the Middle
East, Iraq spent much of the latter stages of the Cold War era battling with its neighbor Iran.
Believing that the United States would not intervene directly, and that the Soviet Union was too
weak to respond, Saddam thought he could take Kuwait unopposed. Using his veteran
Republican Guard, Saddam’s forces crossed the Iraq Kuwait border on August 2, 1991. The
initial force consisted of two armored divisions supported by Special Forces using heliborne
landings to secure the roads leading up to Kuwait City. On the second day three more Iraqi
armored divisions poured into the country and the outnumbered Kuwait military was quickly
overrun. With Saudi oilfields now within striking distance of Saddam’s forces, the United States
was called upon to intervene. 150
The crisis in the Middle East was a unique challenge for the United States military. Since
the Vietnam war, the United States had largely avoided any direct and committed military
interventions. Though they had developed the doctrine of AirLand Battle in the 1980s, they had
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not demonstrated any of its principles in a live war. The potential conflict with Iraq was also
significant as it gave the United States an opportunity to fight against a Soviet style military.
E.R. Horton and Tom Copper’s analysis of the Gulf war, Desert Storm: The Iraqi Invasion of
Kuwait and Operation Desert Shield 1991, shows how the Iraqi army was armed with
predominantly Soviet weapons. This included over 1,000 T-72 tanks, around 200 BMPs, 35
152MM 2SW Akatsiya self-propelled artillery, and Mig 25 and SU-20 fighter jets. 151 The calls
for assistance by Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations also meant the United States had a
massive logistical problem should they decide to intervene. American military presence in the
Middle East was relatively small at this time. However, with the Cold War winding down, the
United States and its NATO allies found the flexibility needed to move forces from Central
Europe into the Middle East. 152
The decision to intervene military against Saddam’s regime by President Bush and other
NATO leaders led to a major logistical undertaking, an area that was lacking for the Wehrmacht
during World War Two. The initial goal of the U.S. forces was to protect Saudi Arabian interests
and build up a massive military force in the region, hence the name Operation Desert Shield.
U.S. Air Force squadrons begin arriving within the first thirty hours of the orders to deploy, and
by the end of October 1991, over 500,000 personnel and roughly 3.7 million tons of supplies
were moved into the region. While the buildup of forces unfolded, Revolutionary Guard forces
began fortifying their positions in Kuwait. On the flip side, American theater commander
General Norman Schwarzkopf began drawing battleplans. The United States intended to fight a
battle of maneuver warfare that in more ways than one resembled the 1940 invasion of France. 153
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The battleplan called for deception and maneuverability that would catch the Iraqi forces off
guard. The overall goal of the operation was not just to push back Saddam’s forces, but
absolutely annihilate them using encirclement maneuvers supported by close coordination with
the air force. 154
Like the German invasion of France, the plan was largely reliant on deception of the
Iraqi forces. The American forces wanted Saddam to believe the main attack was coming at his
fortified positions on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, while in reality the main attack was to come
against a more lightly defended position to the West of the heavily fortified Iraqi lines. These
positions were more lightly defended due to the “Southern Desert,“ an area of land that Iraqi
military commanders assumed the U.S. forces would not dare cross. Much the same as the
Germans utilized the Ardennes forest, the Americans surprised their foes by doing the
unthinkable. 155 General Schwarzkopf referred to the maneuver as a “Hail Mary” play. While
U.S. and other coalition forces in the center kept the fortified Revolutionary Guard forces in
place, an armored thrust crossed the Southern Desert, quickly overrunning the lightly fortified
positions to the West. Once they had broken through, they crashed into the right flank of the
Revolutionary Guard forces completely by surprise. 156 Like the Germans during the 1940
French campaign, the Americans decision to attack at an unsuspecting point on the battlefield
and their outflanking of heavily fortified Iraqi positions worked with shocking success.
The display of maneuver warfare and deception were not the only display examples of a
modern Blitzkrieg. The United States military also demonstrated a superb integration of
Combined Arms Theory via helicopters and airplanes. While the main armored thrust crashed
Ibid., 280.
Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 280; Lowry, Gulf War Chronicles, 1023.
156
Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 280-281.
154
155

62

into the Iraqi forces, U.S. military forces using heliborne attacks established forward bases all
along Highway 8, the main road leading back into Iraq from Kuwait. The American air force
also played a crucial role similar to how the Luftwaffe acted in the invasion of France. The
beginning role of the air force can be broke down into three steps: First, the destruction of
strategic positions in Iraq, second was suppression of Iraqi air defense systems, finally was came
the coordination of close ground support with U.S. forces in Kuwait. 157 The results were
devastating just as the Luftwaffe’s was during the invasion of France and Operation Barbarossa.
Almost immediately, the U.S. air force's hindered the Iraq‘s ability to conduct war by knocking
out key strategic bases such as the National Air Defense Center in Baghdad. American planes
also destroyed Iraqi planes on the ground and within a week had essentially wiped out the
Saddam‘s air force. With Iraqi air defenses and warplanes effectively destroyed, NATO air
forces now turned their attention to the destruction of Iraqi ground forces. 158 The success of the
NATO forces was operational air war, a term coined by the Luftwaffe in 1925, carried out to
perfection. 159
Like the French during the opening phases of Fall Gelb, the Iraqi forces found themselves
in total disarray. The stunning success and speed of the operation shocked even American
military planners, as the campaign lasted only one hundred hours. By gaining superiority of the
air and out maneuvering the Revolutionary Guards, U.S. forces annihilated the encircled Iraqi
forces. 160 The climax of the battle came on February 26, as Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait
City. Along the Basra Highway leading out of the city, columns of defenseless Iraqi tanks, troop
transports, and other vehicles were annihilated by U.S. air power. The spectacle of the
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dominance of airpower was rightfully named the “Highway of Death,“ as thousands of Iraqi
soldiers perished in the onslaught. 161 After decades of trial and error, the United States had
finally achieved a decisive victory in one bold operation. As the Germans in 1940 had
succeeded in rendering France’s Maginot Line useless with maneuverability, the United States
had done the same by crossing the Southern Desert and bypassing the Iraqi fortified positions.
Using helicopter assaults and devastating airstrikes, the United States completely disorientated
the Iraqi forces and with close coordination with ground forces, completely destroyed a heavily
armed military force.
In conclusion, this chapter shows the evolution of American military doctrine
throughout the Cold War and into Operation Desert Storm. This evolution was heavily
influenced by the German success at Blitzkrieg during the early phases of World War Two. The
United States military’s desire to learn from and emulate Blitzkrieg is supported by evidence
such as the U.S. Army Historical Divisions studies, studies conducted by American military
officers such as Major Knorr and General Du Puy, and the scores of articles written in Military
Review during the 1970s and 1980s. While these desires stemmed from an admiration of the
operational success of the Wehrmacht, I have also shown how the context of the Cold War
influenced the evolution. Believing that a war with the Soviets was inevitable and recognizing
the similar strategic position to the Wehrmacht in World War Two, the United States opted to
emulate Blitzkrieg. Instead of an all-out war with the Soviets, the United States instead fought
limited wars of containment on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam. The fruitless ending to
these conflicts brought United States military leaders back to the drawing board. Under the
leadership of General Du Puy and the TRADOC, the United States developed the doctrine of
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Air-Land Battle in the 1980s. As shown in this chapter, Air-Land Battle was almost identical to
the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung doctrine used during World War Two. During the Gulf war in
1991, these Blitzkrieg maneuver warfare principles were used to achieve a decisive victory with
minimal casualties. The success of Operation Desert Storm led to a breakthrough in U.S.
military thinking, decisive victory is obtainable by a war of movement on the operational
level. 162
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
This project argues that World War II and Cold War doctrine was heavily influenced by
the early success of the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg, particularly the invasion of France and the
opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. Looking at specific developments from the 1940s all
the way through the 1990s, there is significant evidence the United States military desired to
emulate a successful Blitzkrieg style campaign. During World War II, the United States
committed its industrial might to create a predominantly motorized fighting force. The U.S.
Army Historical Division conducted interviews and studies of former Wehrmacht officers from
1945-1961, focusing heavily on the Blitzkrieg campaigns in Poland, France and particularly
Russia. The development of Air-land Battle in the 1980s was essentially an English translated
version of the German Truppenführung. These examples show how the 20th century American
military was heavily influenced by a foreign power and a former enemy in the Germans.
The trend of foreign concepts of war influencing American military doctrine is not
isolated to World War II. During World War I, American military doctrine was heavily
influenced by their French allies. The French emphasized doctrine of systematic approach of
finding, pinning, and destroying the enemy with overwhelming firepower. Robert Citino argues
that during the last year of the war in 1918, the United States successfully employed this strategy
against the war weary Imperial German forces. During the Interwar period the United States
officially adopted this approach with the 1923 F.S.R (Field Service Regulation) essentially being
a translated version of the French manual of 1921. This doctrine remained in place in the United
States through the early phases of World War II. 163 Despite the Allied victory over Nazi
Germany, the French style of attrition warfare with massive firepower as proven obsolete in
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comparison to German’s maneuver style Blitzkrieg campaigns. The 1940 invasion of France
resulted in a swift German victory that shocked the world, and arguably changed the nature of
warfare forever.
In the first chapter I discussed the origins of the Blitzkrieg campaign and showed how the
Germans developed a doctrine of mobile warfare during the interwar period. In reality, there
was nothing significantly innovative about the concept of Blitzkrieg doctrine, and its success was
highly exaggerated by both the Allies and the Germans. In fact, the term Blitzkrieg is absent
from any official German military doctrine. Rather than developing an entirely new concept of
warfare, interwar German military leaders, such as Hans von Seeckt and Heinz Guderian,
integrated modern technology into the traditional nineteenth century approach of maneuver
warfare. This approach emphasized maneuverability, intuitive leadership, application of force at
key points of contention, and mass encirclements of enemy forces to achieve a decisive victory.
The nature of static warfare and development of new technologies such as the tank, airplane, and
machine guns created setbacks for maneuver warfare, as militaries on both sides struggled with
how to integrate these developments. The German forces also recognized the issue of
information overload and growing scope of armies and operations leading to indecisiveness on
the front lines. 164
During the interwar period, General von Seeckt addressed these issues and formed the
basis for what would become known as Blitzkrieg. Seeking to create a small professional
fighting force capable of winning short decisive victories, the interwar German army developed
Truppenführung. While there are no direct references to Blitzkrieg within the doctrine, the
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principles laid out are those associated with the success of lightning war. Principles laid out
within Truppenführung combined with modern Combined Arms Theory were the formula for
success during the Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns. During the 1939 invasion of
Poland, the 1940 invasion of France, and the initial invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the
shocking speed and success of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe set the pace for the rest of the war.
The other major warring nations, chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union, knew the path
to victory lied in committing to mobilized warfare and integrated Combined Arms Theory.
While the United States successfully out produced the Germans in tanks and airplanes, they did
not achieve the operational success that the Germans obtained in the early phases of the war.
Almost immediately after the conclusion of World War II, another war, this one between
the United States and the Soviet Union, appeared inevitable. Seeking to gain any sort of
advantage over their potential adversaries, the Americans quickly employed former Wehrmacht
officers in an analytical capacity. By examining the studies of the Wehrmacht conducted by the
United States Army Historical Division, we can see the emphasis on learning from the
Wehrmacht’s early Blitzkrieg campaigns successes. As the Cold War intensified throughout the
1950s and 1960s, the American military leaders recognized the similarities between their
strategic position in Central and Western Europe and the Germans on the Eastern Front from
1943-1944. This premise is demonstrated by the shift in focus of the Army Historical Divisions
studies in volume seventeen, which focuses heavily on the German execution of defensive
warfare against the Soviets. Concepts such as counter attacking armored offensives, breaking
through envelopments, and coordination with air forces all had an impact on the American’s and
NATO’s course of action in the event of an all-out war in Europe.

68

Instead of a traditional war breaking out in Central and Western Europe, the Cold War
instead evolved into smaller limited wars of containment. In Korea and Vietnam, the
technologically superior United States’ armed forces were largely ineffective against enemy
forces that relied heavily on light infantry and insurgent tactics. The results of both wars left the
American military seeking major reforms. Under General William Dupuy the American military
began to shift away from their traditional approach of mass of firepower against the enemy.
Citing the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht during World War Two and drawing from the lessons
of “Active Defense” in volume seventeen of the German military studies, Dupuy and
TRACDOC created the doctrine of “Extended Battle” designed to counter a Warsaw pack
armored offensive in Europe. The doctrine also emphasized the importance of Combined Arms
theory, and integrated new technologies like the helicopter and fighter jets into the doctrine.
Another crucial development in the post-Vietnam era was the shift to create a more highly
trained professional infantry forces, comparable to the Wehrmacht's development in the inter-war
era.
Eventually, Extended Battle doctrine evolved into AirLand battle during the 1980s.
While there is no direct reference to the Wehrmacht or Blitzkrieg within the doctrine, the
connections are clear. AirLand Battle called for interservice cooperation between ground and
land forces and heavily emphasized maneuverability. Officers were also encouraged to use a
mission-based tactics approach, emphasizing soldiers to know the objective of the operation and
to use instincts and creativity to achieve its goals. By examining AirLand Battle, the connections
to the Wehrmacht's Truppenführung are obvious. American military planners anticipated
AirLand Battle would be implemented against the Soviets in the event of an all-out war in
Europe. At the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin California, the American military
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prepared rigorously for a war with the Soviets using war game scenarios. AirLand Battle is not
the only indication of an admiration of the Wehrmacht by American military planners.
Numerous articles written in Military Review during the 1980s and studies such as that by Major
Marvin Knorr also show the fascination with the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg tactics. At the center
of this fascination was the anticipated war with the Soviet Union.
The war that the United States prepared for from 1946-1990 never came to pass. The
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and the threat of war become unlikely under new Soviet
leadership. Instead, the next war the United States found itself in was with Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was perhaps the climax
of the decades of trial and error the United States experienced during the Cold War. The United
States and their NATO allies executed an almost flawless offensive operation against the heavily
entrenched Iraqi forces. Using aggressive maneuverability and seamless interservice cooperation
between ground and air forces, the American coalition achieved in destroying the fighting ability
with their enemy with rapid results and minimal loss of life. Operation Desert Storm was
executed in just under one hundred days, almost mimicking the success of the Wehrmacht’s
early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II. After decades of searching for the formula for
decisive battlefield victory, the United States finally achieved their own modern Blitzkrieg
campaign.
Perhaps today, the United States military is at a crossroads once again. After the
September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the United States made another
incursion into the Middle East, a conflict that is still on going to this day. The insurgent style
warfare and complex battlefield of the current situation has left the United States in a bit of a
quagmire in the region, one that seems never ending at the moment. At the same time, the
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growing power of China and a resurgent Russia also offer challenges. The rise of the digital age
and the overflow of information perhaps has created the same problems that German military
planners recognized during the World War I era. What is clear and what this project argues is
that the American military was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg over the
course of the Cold War era. After decades of trial and error, the United States finally grasped
operational superiority by employing Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg. With the execution of
Operation Desert Storm, the quest for decisive victory was complete.
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